The Evidence on North South Divide
The myths (on home page) highlights some key points on why HS2 will not solve the north south divide. This new note gives a 2 page summary of the key evidence that shows why HS2 will not benefit the north, and who says it.
Consultation Business Case – Feb 2011
The DfT have published a new Business Case (on 28 February 2011) to support their Consultation. This updates their original case that was published in the March 2010 White Paper, with many supporting papers (at DfT links).
Latest review (released 12 June 2011)
HS2AA have revised their previous Review of the DfT/HS2 February Consultation Business Case for HS2 (released Feb 2011). Version 1.12 dated 17 June 2011 is now available.
A summary of 5 key arguments against the Economic Case can be viewed here.
One of the reasons, the government state, for needing HS2 is that it will solve the West Coast Main Line's capacity problems. Philip Hammond has recently made statements about WCML being "full by 2022" and "completely overcrowded by 2022". These facts are not supported by Network Rail's own forecasts (that infer WCML will not be full for another 38 years) or indeed the DfT's own figures (which say 47 years). With regards standing room only, well Network Rail state that only 5% of all services will see passengers standing by 2024. Read more here.
Previous Review (released 29 March 2011)
HS2AA has completed an Initial Review of their case for Phase 1 (London to West Midlands) and then Phase 2 (completing the ‘Y’ network onwards to Manchester and Leeds. They have found:
- The new case is worse than the old – by a third for Phase 1 and nearly a half for the full Y network. This is on the basis of the criteria DfT use for assessing value for money ie the net benefit ratio (the economic and social benefit per £1 of subsidy).
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WEI: Wider Economic Impacts
2. The main changes concern a lower forecast for long distance rail demand. DfT have now taken into account the lower growth forecasts for the economy and the higher fares (RPI + 3% for 3 years). This has the effect of substantially reducing the benefits, and explains the worse NBR.
3. There are very few other changes – in either the costs or the benefits. As in the original business case there are still very few figures to support the ‘Y’ network, most concern Phase 1.
4. The review finds that even this substantially worse business case still depends on DfT relying on a number of invalid assumptions:
- Rail demand on key long distance routes will double
The DFT is over estimating demand for long distance train services by, it is estimated, some 47%.
To reach their figure the DFT has used a short term forecasting model but applied it over 35 year period (to 2043). This is a 10 year increase on what was done in the March 2010 HS2 business case (to 2033), which itself was longer than normally used. They also continue to use an out of date version of their model that exaggerates long distance demand, despite research they commissioned confirming its wrong.
- Time spent on trains is currently wholly unproductive
DFT suggests that correcting this obvious factual inaccuracy would make no difference to the overall benefit as crowding benefits and transfer from air and car would replace the claimed gain.
This ignores the fact that upgrading existing infrastructure will deliver less crowded trains and that air passengers will shortly benefit from the same mobile technologies as rail, and be as productive as rail travellers. Passengers switching from car to HS2 will account for just seven percent of all passengers.
- Reduced crowding and shorter waiting times will deliver benefits
When compared to upgrading the existing rail system these benefits disappear.‘Rail Package 2’ (developed by DfT delivers a load factor of 51% while HS2 has a load factor of 58%.
5. Re-doing the sums and putting them on a realistic basis shows the taxpayer gets back just 30pence to 60pence for every £1 spent
Net Benefit Ratio Summary (economic and social benefits per £1 of subsidy)
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6. The review also identifies other issues:
- Lack of scenarios - despite HS1 experience, DfT’s past undertakings and what was said to HS2 Ltd’s Technical Challenge Group
- How existing services will suffer
- No proper assessment of the alternatives of uprating the existing railway, with alternatives buried and misrepresented as not producing the required capacity
- Lack of evidence on improving the North South divide
- Optimistic carbon emissions assumptions
See the executive summary(‘HS2: a costly white elephant’) of the full report.
A presentation based on the report given to local authorities can be seen here
Challenging opinions (released 29 March 2011)
HS2AA have also produced a short Q and A covering 10 issues. These 10 questions are central to whether the case for a £30bn new high speed railway stands up.
A5 flyer – ‘RP2 not HS2: a better alternative to high speed rail’ (March 2011)
We have produced an A5 handout for use at the HS2 roadshows that tells the facts that DfT won’t. It particularly highlights the alternative for Phase 1 – Rail Package 2 (RP2) that uprates the West Coast Mainline. RP2 delivers urgently needed capacity (for the commuter) besides meeting long distance capacity requirements for the next 35 years.
RP2 is cheaper, greener and better value for money than HS2.
A note to prove that RP2 really does deliver 151% more capacity (and not the 54% that government say) on WCML compared to 2008. It sources all the figures sourced form DfT's own documents (even the documents where they redid the costs and benefits for RP2)
‘HS2 train ticket’ (March 2011)
For greater impact we have an HS2 train ticket that visitors to the roadshows might find entertaining.
